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Zero Tolerance or Zero Sense?: A Guide to Challenging Zero Tolerance Disciplinary Policies 
in Public Schools 
by 
Brian Quinn 
 
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve 
neither liberty nor safety.1 
 
While school officials may not have the right answers, they have to err on the 
side of caution.2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In response to incidents of school violence, public school systems are “getting tough” by 
implementing zero tolerance policies that impose harsh, predetermined penalties for student 
misconduct.3  Most people would agree that schools should not tolerate the possession of 
weapons or drugs on school property.  Additionally, most would agree that schools, and more 
importantly students, should not tolerate the threat of violence in their classrooms.  The real 
debate surrounding the implementation and application of zero tolerance policies is whether 
schools should impose predetermined consequences irrespective of the particularized 
circumstances of a student’s misconduct.  Stated differently, the debate  “is over the automatic 
nature and severity of such punishments,”4 and the question becomes “[i]s a singular, 
preordained punishment for any category of offense fair and lawful?”5 
The use of zero tolerance disciplinary policies in schools has “come under fire” from the 
media, concerned parents, and special interest groups in recent years.6  Most of the public’s 
apprehension over zero tolerance is not focused upon the substance of such policies, but rather 
                                                 
1 Benjamin Franklin 
2 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE 
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2 (2000) (“Advancement Project”). 
3 See Scott F. Uhler & David J. Fish, Zero-Tolerance Discipline in Illinois Public Schools, Ill. Bar. J. at 1(May 
2001), available at http://www.illinoisbar.org/Member/may011j/p256.htm. 
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Id. at 2.   
6 See id.   
the focus is on whether the punishments and procedures have “some reasonable connection to the 
misconduct in question [and whether] school officials have reasonably determined that 
intentional misconduct occurred.”7  Countless media reports have illustrated the absurdity of 
adhering to such a rigid approach in certain situations. 
A story from Mississippi illustrates how the application of zero tolerance policies in some 
instances defies commonsense. 
[S]tudents on a school bus were playfully throwing peanuts at one another.  
A peanut accidentally hit the white female bus driver, who immediately pulled 
over to call the police.  After the police arrived, the bus was diverted to the 
courthouse, where children were questioned.  Five African-American males, ages 
17 and 18, were then arrested for felony assault, which carries a maximum of five 
years in prison.  The Sheriff commented to one newspaper, “[T]his time it was 
peanuts, but if we don’t get a handle on it, the next time it could be bodies.”  The 
young men lost their bus privileges and suspension was recommended.  As a 
result of the assistance of an attorney and community pressure, the criminal 
charges were dismissed.  However, all five young men, who were juniors and 
seniors, dropped out of school because they lacked transportation to travel the 
[thirty] miles to their school in this poor, rural county in the Mississippi delta.  
The impact of the punishment was underscored by one of the young men who 
stated, “I [would have] gone to college.”…This young man, who earned A-grades 
in his favorite subject, math, wanted to graduate…Reportedly, the other young 
men are simply “hanging out,” at risk of getting into trouble.8 
 
Nevertheless, proponents of zero tolerance policies argue that it is in the students’ best 
interest to err on the side of caution when dealing with perceived threats to school safety.9  Some 
administrators believe that the media’s over-sensationalizing of zero tolerance events adds to the 
public’s misunderstanding of the policies.  Furthermore, administrators assert that the general 
public cannot fully appreciate the enormous duty educators face to keep schools safe on a daily 
                                                 
7 Id.  
8 Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 3. 
9 See id. at 2. 
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basis.10  Yet, the success of zero tolerance policies is debatable and such policies have become a 
common subject of litigation in our courts.11 
This comment will examine the competing philosophies surrounding the zero tolerance 
debate as well as the legality of such policies.  In sum, this comment will examine the legal 
issues necessary to challenge a zero tolerance disciplinary policy.  Part One will explore the 
history surrounding the implementation of zero tolerance policies in public schools.  Next, some 
examples of media reports will illustrate how the application of such policies defies 
commonsense because school officials are precluded from exercising discretion.  The comment 
will then set forth the theoretical arguments for and against zero tolerance disciplinary policies, 
as well as the general legal standards applicable to student suspensions and expulsions.  Finally, 
Part One will highlight recent cases that have challenged zero tolerance policies.  At the end of 
Part One, it will become clear that the arguments for and against zero tolerance in public schools 
run deep.  It will also become clear that students are not adequately protected under the law. 
Part Two of the comment will outline the various legal arguments a student advocate may 
advance when challenging the validity of a zero tolerance disciplinary policy.  Because such 
policies necessarily implicate due process concerns, these claims will be examined in detail.  In 
addition to due process claims, zero tolerance policies may be attacked due to their 
disproportionate impact on both students of color and students with disabilities.  As such, these 
types of claims will be examined as well.  In the end, however, it will become apparent that 
successfully challenging a zero tolerance policy on legal grounds is a difficult task.  
I.  Background 
 A.  A Brief History of Zero Tolerance Policies 
                                                 
10 See id. 
11 See Uhler & Fish, supra note 3, at 1. 
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 It’s difficult to find an exact definition of the term “zero tolerance” or an exact point in 
time in which the revolution began.12  In its purest sense, zero tolerance policies provide for 
nondiscretionary, predetermined punishment guidelines for certain behaviors.13  The zero 
tolerance methodology first gained national notoriety in the 1980’s during the Reagan 
administration’s war on drugs.14  Reagan’s federal drug policy targeted the illegal transportation 
of narcotics into the country.15  The program, appropriately titled “Zero Tolerance,” required 
border officials to seize the vehicles and property of persons entering the United States with even 
trace amounts of narcotics and charge such persons in federal court to the utmost extent of the 
law.16  By punishing all drug related offenses severely and uniformly, the program was intended 
to send a message that such illegal behavior will no longer be tolerated in the United States.17  
The federal approach to the drug trade aroused the public’s interest in the zero tolerance 
method.18 
 “[F]ueled by media hype, fear of the unthinkable, and perhaps even a bit of guilt,” parents 
placed enormous pressure on their school boards to adopt far reaching policies to deal with 
“problem students” in the wake of tragic incidents involving school violence.19  In response to 
such concerns and anxious to send a no-nonsense message, school boards and school officials 
began to implement their own zero tolerance policies modeled after the federal drug program to 
                                                 
12 See RUSSELL J. SKIBA, ZERO TOLERANCE, ZERO EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE 2 
(Ind. Educ. Pol. Center Aug. 2000).  
13 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 2. 
14 See Skiba, supra note 12, at 2. 
15 See id.  
16 See id.  
17 See id.  
18 See id.  (“The language of zero tolerance seemed to fire the public imagination and within months began to be 
applied to a broad range of issues, ranging from environmental pollution and trespassing to skateboarding, 
homelessness, and boom boxes.”). 
19 Margaret Graham Tebo, Zero Tolerance, Zero Sense: School Violence is a Hot-Button Issue but are Strict, 
Inflexible Policies the Answer? Some Say Yes, While Others Insist That All-Or-Nothing Punishment Merely Alienate 
Students, 86-APR A.B.A. J. 40, 41 (2000). 
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ensure school safety.20  In the educational setting then, a “zero tolerance policy is generally 
defined as a school or district policy that mandates predetermined consequences or punishment 
for specific offenses, regardless of the circumstances or disciplinary history of the student.”21   
“Beginning in 1989, school districts in California, New York, and Kentucky mandated 
expulsion for drugs, fighting, and gang-related activity.”22  Such policies focused on criminal and 
potentially dangerous student behavior, requiring mandatory expulsion or lengthy suspension for 
such offenses.23  Eventually, the movement gained more momentum, and what originally began 
at the grassroots school district level now resulted in statewide regulations and legislation.24  
Schools throughout the nation abandoned the rehabilitative method of education and began to 
employ harsher policies in response to the perceived increase in school violence.25  After years of 
campaigns designed at keeping at-risk students in the public school system, the zero tolerance 
movement instead sought to identify the “problem students” and remove them from school 
before violence erupted in the classroom.26 
The federal government also became enamored with the zero tolerance approach to 
prevent school violence.  In 1994, Congress passed the Gun-Free Schools Act (“the Act”).27  The 
Act mandates a one-year expulsion for a student in possession of a firearm on school property 
                                                 
20 See Skiba, supra note 12, at 2; Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 1; J. Kevin Jenkins & John Dayton, 
Students, Weapons, and Due Process: An Analysis of Zero Tolerance Policies in Public Schools, 171 ED. LAW. REP. 
13 (2003). 
21 Julie Underwood, General Counsel for the National School Boards Association, available at www.nsba.org.  
22 Skiba, supra note 12, at 2. 
23 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 1. 
24 See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Anthony J. DeMarco, Weapons in Schools and Zero Tolerance (1996), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjweapons.html; see also Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 17 
(“[P]oliticians seeking to woo voters with their ‘tough on crime’ agendas have used Zero Tolerance as a popular 
sound bite.”). 
25 See Alicia C. Insley, Suspending and Expelling Children From Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero 
Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1045 (2001). 
26 See Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became a War 
on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 64-65 (2002). 
27 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7151 (West Supp. 2002); see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 26, at 64. 
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and referral of the student to the appropriate law enforcement agency.28  Furthermore, the Act 
conditions federal educational funding upon the enactment of similar state legislation that also 
imposes a mandatory one-year expulsion for students carrying a firearm.29  Needless to say, all 
fifty states have complied with the Act, although it is unclear whether the states have done so out 
of a sense of moral obligation or out of fear over losing their much needed federal funding.30  
Originally written, the Act covered only the possession of firearms.31  States and school districts, 
though, were confronted with public pressure to expand the coverage of their zero tolerance 
policies beyond the Congressional mandate.32 
 Many school districts have now broadened the scope of zero tolerance to punish types of 
behaviors that pose little or no threat to general school safety, including drug or alcohol 
possession, fighting, threats, swearing, and “disruptive behavior.”33  While there is some 
variation on how individual school districts apply their zero tolerance policies,34 it is evident that 
such policies prefer the elimination of students to the elimination of unwanted behavior, 
                                                 
28 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7151 (West Supp. 2002); see also Skiba, supra note 12, at 2. 
29 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 26, at 64-65; see also Shepherd & DeMarco, supra note 24 (The Act 
provides that “no federal assistance under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 [42 U.S.C. §§ 
6301-92 (2000)] would be available to school districts that do not provide for the mandatory expulsion for at least 
one year of students who bring firearms to school.”). 
30 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 26, at 65; Insley, supra note 25, at 1047-48 (“[T]he percentage of schools 
with [zero tolerance] policies has never fallen below seventy-five percent.”). 
31 See Skiba, supra note 12, at 2.  “[A]mendments have broadened the language of the bill to included any 
instrument that may be used as a weapon.”  Id. 
32 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 1; see also Blumenson and Nilsen, supra note 26, at 65-68. 
33 See e.g. Skiba, supra note 12, at 2.    
Almost all schools report having zero-tolerance policies for firearms (94 percent) and weapons 
other than firearms (91 percent), according to the National Center for Education 
Statistics…Eighty-seven percent of schools have zero-tolerance policies for alcohol, and 88 
percent have policies for drugs.  Most schools also have zero-tolerance policies for violence and 
tobacco (79 percent each). 
TOBIN MCANDREWS, ZERO TOLERANCE POLICIES 1 (2001), available at www.ericfacility.net/ericdigests/ed451579. 
htm. 
34 See Skiba, supra note 12, at 2; see also National School Safety and Security Services, Zero Tolerance, 
available at www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/  zero_tolerance.htm. 
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punishment over prevention.  Indeed, the phrase “zero tolerance” has become a buzzword in 
education and “has taken on a life of its own.”35 
B. Absurd Stories 
The following are but a few of the examples where application of zero tolerance policies 
defies commonsense, dealing with such subjects as so-called weapon or drug possession, 
fighting, dress codes, beeper possession, and sexual harassment. 
 An eighth grade middle school student in Virginia was removed from school for violating 
the school’s zero tolerance policy on weapon possession.  The student’s friend passed 
him a note stating that she had brought a knife to school, hid it in her notebook, and was 
contemplating using it for suicide.  The student persuaded his friend to turn it over and 
took the notebook containing the knife to his locker for safekeeping.  A fellow student 
reported that the student had a knife in his locker and the eighth grader was suspended for 
over three months.36 
 A thirteen-year old honor student from Ohio was suspended under a zero tolerance policy 
for drug possession and drug transmitting for ingesting a Midol tablet and giving another 
Midol to a classmate.  The student went to the school clinic due to severe menstrual pain.  
The school nurse took her temperature, allowed her to rest, and unsuccessfully attempted 
to contact her mother.  The nurse left the room and the student took two Midol tablets 
from a medicine box left open on a cot.  The student ingested one tablet and gave another 
tablet to a classmate complaining of menstrual cramps. This incident gained national 
coverage, and has become known as “the Midol case.”37 
 A National Merit Scholar from Florida was expelled and jailed after a kitchen knife was 
found in her car.  The girl was in the process of moving and the knife was left in the car 
over the weekend.  School officials saw the knife on the floor of the car in the student 
parking lot.  The student was charged with felony possession of a weapon on school 
                                                 
35 National School Safety and Security Services, Zero Tolerance, available at www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/  
zero_tolerance.htm. 
36 See The Rutherford Institute, Zero Tolerance Strikes Again: Eighth-Grade Student Suspended for Saving Friend’s 
Life (May 7, 2001), available at http://www/rutherford.org/articles_db/press_release.asp?article_id+164. 
37 See Perry A. Zirkel, The Midol Case, Phi Delta Kappan: The Professional Journal for Education (June 30, 1997), 
available at http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kzir9706.htm; see also CNN, ‘Midol suspension’ ends: Honor student 
returns to class (Oct. 3, 1996), available at http://www.cnn.com/US /9610/03/midol.suspension/index.html. 
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property, was suspended for five days, and was unable to partake in graduation 
activities.38 
 A fourteen-year old student from Ohio accidentally left a pocketknife in his backpack 
after a Boy Scout trip the previous weekend.  The student’s Scout Master testified on his 
behalf, but to no avail.  The student was expelled under the district’s zero tolerance 
policy which required mandatory expulsion for the possession of a knife on school 
property.  The student was eventually readmitted to school due the efforts of Legal Aid, 
but the student had missed eighty days of school as a result of the ordeal.39 
 A kindergartner from Virginia was suspended from school for bringing a beeper to school 
and showing it to a classmate during a field trip.  The five-year old was suspended for 
violating the school’s zero tolerance beeper policy.  The student’s mother stated that the 
kindergartner brought the beeper to school because he liked the sound that it made.40 
 At an Indiana high school, two graduating seniors, who were also Marine recruits, were 
prohibited from attending their graduation for not compiling with the graduation dress 
code: a collared shirt, tie, and slacks.  Instead, the two students donned their dress blue 
uniforms.41 
 A nine-year old Louisiana boy was suspended from school for drawing a picture, 
pursuant to an in-class assignment, of a solider carrying a knife.42 
 A kindergartner from Pennsylvania was suspended from school for bringing a plastic ax 
as part of his Halloween costume.43 
  A second grader from Louisiana was suspended from school for bringing her 
grandfather’s pocket watch for “show-and-tell.”  The watch had a tiny knife attached.44 
 A ten-year old student from Colorado was expelled from her elementary school because 
her mother placed a small knife in her lunchbox in order to cut an apple.  The student, 
                                                 
38 See Associated Press, Fort Meyers Honor Student Arrested Under Zero-Tolerance Policy (May 23, 2001), 
available at http://www.oblivion.net/news/display.php?articleID=447. 
39 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 4. 
40 See CNN, Kindergartner suspended for bringing beeper to school (Oct. 29, 1996), available at http://www.cnn. 
com/US/9610/29/briefs/beeper/index.html.  
41 See Edwin J. Feulner, Ph.D., Zero Tolerance? Try Zero Wisdom, The Heritage Foundation (June 29, 2001), 
available at http://www.hertiage.org/Press/Commentary/ed06292001.cfm. 
42 See id. 
43 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 4. 
44 See Dennis Cauchon, Zero-tolerance policies lack flexibility, USA Today (April 13, 1999), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/educate/ednews3.htm.  
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who realized that the knife was violative of the school’s zero tolerance policy, informed 
her teacher of the knife.  The student was praised for her honesty, but, nevertheless, the 
student was expelled for weapon possession.45 
 A six-year old student was suspended under a Colorado school district’s zero tolerance 
drug policy for giving lemon drops to a fellow classmate.46 
 A ten-year girl from Colorado was suspended from school for repeatedly asking a boy if 
“he liked her.”  The boy complained to a teacher and school officials suspended her under 
the district’s zero tolerance sexual harassment policy.47 
 A seventh grade student from Ohio faced an expulsion hearing for allegedly sniffing 
“White-Out” during class.  Under the district’s zero tolerance drug policy, the school 
recommended expulsion.  The student denied the allegations and drug experts testified on 
the student’s behalf that “White-Out” is not a drug in any event.  In the end, the student 
was suspended from school for a total of nine days and her school records indicate that 
her suspension was due to drug abuse.48 
 
C. Overall Effectiveness 
It has been well over a decade since public schools began implementing zero tolerance 
disciplinary policies and the overall effectiveness of such policies is debatable. A “strong body 
of compelling research” suggests that such policies generally fall short of widely accepted 
educational principles.49  Additionally, as the numerous media reports highlighted above 
indicate, the application of these policies in some instances defies commonsense.50  Opponents 
of zero tolerance assert that the long-term implications of such policies, particularly when 
viewed in light of zero tolerance’s questionable success, requires the elimination of the zero 
                                                 
45 See id. 
46 See Randy Cassingham, Losing my Tolerance for “Zero Tolerance,” available at http://www.thistrue.com/zt.html. 
47 See id.  
48 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 6. 
49 Id. at 1. 
50 See id. 
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tolerance philosophy from the educational system entirely.51  Proponents, on the other hand, 
assert that zero tolerance policies have been effective and are necessary to maintain a healthy, 
safe environment conducive to learning.  A third group believes that zero tolerance policies are 
merely a political sound bite and that school officials rarely apply such policies blindly without 
exercising some degree of discretion prior to recommending suspension/expulsion.52 
Each of these competing viewpoints needs to be taken into consideration for any person 
wishing to challenge a zero tolerance policy.  The arguments for and against such policies go to 
such key issues as whether such policies are an educational necessity, whether school officials 
are prohibited from exercising discretion, the disparate impact on students of color and special 
education students, and whether less restrictive means that more fully adhere to educational 
theory are available.  The different arguments not only are relevant to legal attacks, but also are 
crucial for public policy challenges. 
1.  Opponents’ argument 
 The “law and order” approach to education, it is argued, has long-term implications for 
an entire generation of students.53  There are six major arguments opponents advance in support 
of their contention that zero tolerance policies will have a devastating impact on an entire 
generation of students.  First, the application of harsh punishment, irrespective of the 
individualized circumstances of an offense, conflicts with “the prescriptions for healthy child 
development.”54  Specifically, the inflexible punishment guidelines administered by educators is 
at variance with two major psychological needs of children: the need to develop strong, trusting 
relationships with the prominent and influential adults in their lives, and the need to develop a 
                                                 
51 See id.  
52 See National School Safety and Security Services, Zero Tolerance, available at www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/  
zero_tolerance.htm. 
53 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 17. 
54 See id. at 10. 
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positive attitude towards fairness, justice, and the legal system.55  “Kids are not going to respect 
teachers and administrators who cannot appreciate the difference between a plastic knife and a 
switch-blade.”56  These policies cast too wide a net and sweep up many innocent students.  Zero 
tolerance policies further alienate students from society and the adults in their lives, with the 
damage being particularly severe for those students already considered at-risk.57  Children now 
learn at an early age that there is no such thing as a second chance, and the concept of innocent 
until proven guilty is lost.58  Furthermore, the intent to commit an act, a key element in the 
criminal justice system, is irrelevant under zero tolerance policies because school officials 
blindly defer to such policies without exercising discretion.59  As such, students grow to mistrust 
their school, authority figures, and the overall legal system.  Zero tolerance ignores the 
developmental needs of children and instills in them a value system at odds with sound 
educational theory.   
Second, as a result of zero tolerance policies, students are actually less inclined to confide 
in educators.60  As such, incidents of violence may be harder to predict because educators may 
miss the warning signs and cries for help from students because these students do not trust their 
own teachers.  As one scholar noted, “All of the recent school shooters showed some signs of 
either repeated violent fantasies or of detectible mental illness months before their crimes.”61  
Therefore, opponents argue that zero tolerance policies fail as a preventative measure.  Zero 
                                                 
55 See id. 
56 Ralph C. Martin, II,  Chairperson, ABA Criminal Justice Section, ABA Report on Zero Tolerance (Feb. 2001), 
available at www.abanet.org. 
57 See Insley, supra note 25, at 1069; see also Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 8; Ruth Zweifler & Julia De 
Beers, The Children Left Behind: How Zero Tolerance Impacts Our Most Vulnerable Youth, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
191 (2002).  
58 See Tebo, supra note 19, at 41. 
59 See BERIT KJOS, ZERO TOLERANCE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: TEN STEPS TOWARD LIFELONG BEHAVIOR 
MODIFICATION 2, available at http://www.crossroad.to/text/articles/zerotol.html.  
60 See Tebo, supra note 19, at  44. 
61 Id.   
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tolerance is simply a vehicle for those districts that are ill equipped or unwilling to prevent 
school violence by methods such as counseling before those students commit acts of violence.62  
The rehabilitative method, which is considered a preventative measure to some degree, has been 
replaced by zero tolerance, which lies dormant until violence erupts and then punishes such 
violence “severely” after the fact. 
Third, because most zero tolerance policies require the referral of the student to the 
appropriate law enforcement agency for certain offenses, an alarming amount of children are 
being pushed into the criminal justice system.63  Therefore, school districts are shifting their 
disciplinary authority and educational responsibilities to law enforcement agencies to the 
detriment of the children they seek to educate.64  What was once a schoolyard scuffle can now 
land a child in juvenile court or even a criminal proceeding.65  The additional hurdles placed in a 
student’s path, due to the fact that they now have a criminal record, were not as prominent 
twenty years ago because the misconduct would have been dealt with exclusively by the 
school.66  Opponents question whether it is in the child’s best interest, or the community’s 
interest for that matter67, to enmesh students in an unforgiving criminal justice system.68   
                                                 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 41 (“Kids whose misbehaviors in the past would have occasioned oral reprimands from a teacher or 
perhaps a trip to the principal’s office are now being labeled a threat to school safety.  And, those very same kids-
will-be-kids incidents are now prompting punishments ranging from suspension to referral to juvenile court system 
fro behaviors that even the schools agree do not actually compromise safety.”). 
64 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 15. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 16; see also Insley, supra note 25, at 1065 (“In today’s society, young adults without a high school 
diploma find it difficult to obtain an entry-level job or to continue education or training.”). 
67 “On average, a high school dropout costs society between $243,000 and $388,000 over his or her lifetime due to 
both a lack of productivity and dependence on government subsidies.”  Insley, supra note 25, at 1065. 
68 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 16.  Many students are suspended or expelled from school prior to any 
final adjudication of the law enforcement agency or court responsible for the determination.  See Shepherd & 
DeMarco, supra note 24.   
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Fourth, zero tolerance policies necessarily result in the short or long term deprivation of 
education.69  Critics of zero tolerance policies assert that suspensions and expulsions have 
negative consequences on academic performance.70  For example, suspended/expelled students 
may receive failing grades for each day of class they are absent, teachers often do not provide 
assignments in order for the student to keep up their studies, many school districts are not 
required to provide alternative education programs for suspended/expelled students, students 
may be retained in their grade due to excessive absence or an inability to catch up, and students 
may be pressured to drop out of school entirely.71  Therefore, zero tolerance policies are 
contributing to an increasing underclass of uneducated persons that have been pushed away by 
the school itself.72   
Fifth, opponents argue that zero tolerance policies disparately impact African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and disabled children.73  The statistics are alarming: while African-American children 
only represent 17% of national public school enrollment, they constitute 32% of all suspensions; 
25% of African-American male students have been suspended at least once during their 
academic careers.74 A recent study interviewed attorneys representing students of color in 
disciplinary actions. These attorneys indicated that African-American and Hispanic children are 
more likely to be referred to and disciplined under zero tolerance policies, and such racial groups 
tend to be suspended or expelled for more discretionary, subjective offenses such as “defiance of 
                                                 
69 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 13. 
70 See id. 
71 See id.   
The uneducated are primed for unemployment or marginal employment, [citations omitted] and all that 
often comes with it: impoverishment, criminal victimization and temptation, poorer health, shorter lives, 
political powerlessness, and despair.  Disportionate numbers succumb to alcohol or drug abuse.  
Educational privation is also an excellent way to make a person feel fungible and insignificant.  It is a 
formula for subtracting self-esteem and substituting the disdain of others [citations omitted]. 
Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 26, at 75-76.  
72 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 26, at 76. 
73 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 1; Zweifler & De Beers, supra note 57, at 203-05.  
74 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 7 (“White students, 63% of enrollment, represent only 50% of 
suspensions and 50% of expulsions.”). 
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authority.”75  Opponents argue that regardless of whether the disparity is intentional or not, 
“[o]ur society cannot afford to leave any one segment of our population behind.”76  Although not 
a popular argument, statistics have shown that zero tolerance policies have become a tool to 
eliminate students of color from the education system.77 
 Special education students are also adversely affected under zero tolerance policies.  
Disabled children are protected under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act 
(“IDEA”)78 to ensure that they are not punished for behavior that is a manifestation of their 
disability.79  But in many instances, school officials clearly ignore the law and rely on their 
relevant zero tolerance policies to exclude special education students.80  To compound the 
problems faced by disabled children, parents and students are often unaware of their legal rights 
and the procedures to be followed when a special education student is to be excluded from 
school.  Those parents that are aware of the arguably “greater” protections afforded under IDEA 
have sought to circumvent the zero tolerance process by fighting to get their children classified 
as special education in order to keep their child in school.  To make matters worse, the process of 
getting a child qualified for special education can be a long, slow process81 
Seventh, opponents argue that the statistics simply do not show that zero tolerance is 
responsible for greater safety in public schools.82  Opponents are quick to point out that zero 
                                                 
75 See id. at 8.  These same attorneys “assert that school personnel rely upon racial and ethnic stereotypes in taking 
disciplinary action.”  Id. at 9. 
76 Id. at 9. 
77 See Zweifler & De Beers, supra note 57, at 204. 
78 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
79 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
80 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at  9. 
81 See id.; see also Interview with Kathryn L. Quinn, Elementary School Teacher, Mason Public Schools, Mason, MI 
(Jan. 23, 2003). 
82 See Insley, supra note 25, at 1061-62.   
There are many misconceptions about he prevalence of youth violence in our society and it is 
important to peel back the veneer of hot-tempered discourse that often surrounds the issue…While 
it is important to carefully review the circumstances surrounding these horrifying incidents so that 
we may learn from them, we must also be cautious about inappropriately creating a cloud of fear 
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tolerance policies were a response to students committing heinous acts with the use of firearms 
and that firearm cases represent the smallest category of zero tolerance discipline cases.83  When 
principals were asked in a 1997 report conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics 
to list what they deemed the most serious problems in their respective schools, the most common 
problems were tardiness (forty percent), absenteeism (twenty five percent), and fighting (twenty 
one percent).84  Weapon possession (two percent), drug use (nine percent), and gang activity 
(five percent), the aims of the initial zero tolerance movement, were noticeably further down on 
the list of principals’ key concerns.85  Furthermore, the idea that zero tolerance policies will 
reduce school violence fails to acknowledge the obvious:  students, such as the Columbine 
shooters, will not be deterred from mindless acts of violence by the existence of a zero tolerance 
policy.86  Because zero tolerance acts after the fact and such disenfranchised children will not 
care if they are suspended from the school they seek to destroy, zero tolerance policies seem like 
an inappropriate solution. 
 2.  Proponents’ argument  
Despite these assertions, proponents of zero tolerance claim that the policies have, in fact, 
reduced incidents of school violence.  Proponents argue that although the results of zero 
tolerance policies may be hard to swallow in some cases, they are needed to “send an 
unambiguous message that drugs and weapons have no place in school.”87  Proponents are quick 
                                                                                                                                                             
over every student in every classroom across the country.  In the case of youth violence, it is 
important to note that, statistically speaking, schools are among the safest places for children to 
be. 
Martin, supra note 56 (citing Final Report, Bi-Partisan Working Group on Youth Violence, 106th Congress, 
February 2000). 
83 See Martin, supra note 56.  
84 See Russell J. Skiba & Reece Peterson, The Dark Side of Zero Tolerance: Can Punishment Lead to Safe Schools?,  
80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 372 (1999), available at http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kski9901.htm. 
85 See id. 
86 See Tebo, supra note 19, at  44. 
87 Cauchon, supra note 44. 
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to remind the public that school safety still remains an important issue and zero tolerance seems 
to soothe the public’s anxiety over the issue.88  Zero tolerance policies can hardly be seen as an 
overreaction when the incidents of school violence we have witnessed in the past were so 
horrific and the loss suffered so tragic.89 
A safe school allows children to develop mentally and emotionally with their peers, 
adults, and community. 
When children feel safe at home, they are ready to grow.  When in the 
neighborhood, children are ready to play, explore, and form relationships with 
other children.  When they feel safe at school, they are ready to learn and become 
confident and competent adults.90 
 
The costs of zero tolerance, according to proponents, have yet to outweigh the benefits.  While 
opponents are quick to point to an array of statistics showing that zero tolerance policies actually 
do not curb school violence, proponents assert “statistics are hardly reassuring as long as the 
possibility exists that it could happen in our school, to our children.”91  As one superintendent 
commented, “While school officials may not have the right answer, they have to err on the side 
of caution.”92  Zero tolerance policies eliminate the guesswork, and potential civil liability93, 
inherent in an educator’s balancing of school safety against individual student rights. 
 In response to the “Midol case” mentioned above, one principal defended his school’s 
zero tolerance drug policy by arguing that a drug such as Midol could eventually lead to a 
                                                 
88 See 130 Education Reporter 3, Zero Tolerance Creates Imaginary Problems, Penalizes Innocence (Nov. 1996); 
see also Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 1. 
89 See Skiba & Peterson, supra note 84. 
90 Gina E. Polley & Francine Cullari, Peer Mediation in the Classroom: A New Initiative for the State Bar of 
Michigan, 79 MICH. B.J. 1192 (2000).  
91 Skiba & Peterson, supra note 84 (emphasis in original). 
92 Advancement Project, supra note 2, at 1 
93 Critics also a quick to note that zero tolerance policies are really just methods to avoid civil liability.  See Tebo, 
supra note 19, at  41 (“[T]he harshness of the penalties for seemingly innocuous offenses is often fueled less by 
genuine safety concerns and more by fear of lawsuits.”). 
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“slippery slope into [more] lethal drugs.”94  The principal commented, “It’s easy to minimize 
[the situation] and say, well, it’s just pain medication. But it’s a little more serious than that.”95  
 In response to opponents’ argument that zero tolerance casts too to broad of a net and 
sweeps in many students that did not intentionally break the rules, proponents counter by 
asserting that the benefits of such still outweigh these costs.96  As one educator noted, “[T]he 
benefits of zero tolerance policies in raising a school’s overall standard of conduct outweighs the 
harm done to any child who inadvertently breaks a rule.”97  Therefore, while a few students may 
be deprived of their education temporarily, the majority will benefit from zero tolerance policies 
in the long run. 
In any event, proponents argue that even though some school disciplinary policies have 
been labeled as “zero tolerance,” most school administrators retain their ability to exercise 
discretion.98  Many school districts have disciplinary policies for serious student misconduct as 
well as a zero tolerance policy on the books.  Therefore, merely expelling a student for serious 
misconduct does not necessarily mean that a zero tolerance policy was utilized and the particular 
school official failed to exercise some degree of discretion.99 
Also, as mentioned above, scholars have shown that students of color are disparately 
affected under zero tolerance policies.  Proponents assert that the statistics concerning the 
number of minority students suspended or expelled under such policies is misleading.  For 
example, “the unfortunate correlation of race and poverty in our society suggests that inequitable 
                                                 
94 130 Education Reporter 3, Zero Tolerance Creates Imaginary Problems, Penalizes Innocence (Nov. 1996). 
95 Id. 
96 See Kjos, supra note 59. 
97 Id. (citing Tamar Lewin, School Codes Without Mercy Snare Pupils Without Malice, NY Times, 12 March 1997). 
98 See Uhler & Fish, supra note 3, at 3. 
99 See id.  
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racial treatment may be a socioeconomic issue rather than a racial one.”100  Also, intercity 
students, which tend to be students of color, may engage in misconduct more frequently.101     
At this point in time, the data available is hardly conclusive of the proposed success of 
zero tolerance policies.102  The research shows, however, that the school districts that have been 
successful with zero tolerance have engaged in a tier-approach, leaving some discretion with 
administrators.103    In any event, the National Center for Education Statistics has reported that 
zero tolerance policies have had little impact on previously unsafe schools.104   
3. The Realists’ argument 
As can be seen from the enactment of zero tolerance policies across the United States, 
school safety is a political issue, like it or not.  While special interest groups and politicians 
battle over sound bites, some statistics have shown that “zero tolerance [has] little true meaning 
in the day-to-day actions of most educators.”105  Simply put, school administrators still exercise 
discretion in deciding whether to suspend or expel a particular student irrespective of whether a 
zero tolerance policy is in effect. 
National School Safety and Security Services, an organization that works with school 
administrators in over thirty states, explained of how zero tolerance policies are applied in public 
school as a practical matter.  
                                                 
100 Skiba & Peterson, supra note 84.  Skiba and Peterson, however, dismiss this very assertion by stating that 
“studies have continued to find evidence of black overrepresentation in suspension – even after controlling for 
socioeconomic background – suggesting that racial disportionality in suspension involves more than just poverty.”  
Id.  
101 See id.  The authors dismiss this argument as well.  “Yet when rates of behavior for African American and other 
students are taken into account, the differences are minor at best, and behavior makes a weak contribution to 
explaining the discrepancy in the suspension of blacks and whites.”  Id. 
102 “There is little, if any, data showing that zero tolerance policies increase school safety or reduce school 
violence.”  Insley, supra note 25, at 1061. 
103 See Tebo, supra note 19, at  41. 
104 See McAndrews, supra note 33, at 1. 
105 National School Safety and Security Services, Zero Tolerance, available at www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/  
zero_tolerance.htm. 
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[The concept of zero tolerance seems] to rest more in the minds and 
rhetoric of politicians and academicians than it does school 
administrators…[Anecdotal media stories] do not reflect discipline administration 
in most of our nation’s schools. 
The majority of educators strive for firm, fair, and consistent discipline 
applied with good common sense.  Unfortunately, the anecdotal incidents used to 
define zero tolerance appear to lack the common sense piece of the formula.  
Contrary to suggestions by the media, politicians, and Ivory-Tower theorists, the 
real problem is therefore the absence of common sense, not the presence of 
intentionally harsh actions committed to fuel a master nationwide plan called 
“zero tolerance.”106  
 
This view may have some merit, but zero tolerance policies are still on the books in most school 
districts and some, albeit few, educators fail to exercise discretion in suspension or expulsion 
determinations.  Thus, the potential for abuse remains.   
D. Legal Challenges 
Education law is a complex and constantly evolving area of the law.107  As a general 
proposition, “[w]hen students are at school, they are expected to submit to school authority.108  
“In establishing and maintaining a climate conducive to teaching and learning, educators have 
considerable discretion in controlling student conduct.”109  While students are in school, teachers 
stand in loco parentis and, thus, it is necessary for the teacher to have the ability to punish the 
student as the parent would.110  This does not mean, however, that students are left unprotected 
by the law.111  The problem with safeguarding students’ rights is that students, parents, and 
educators are often unaware of the procedures necessary to satisfy legal mandates.  Thus, a brief 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 See CHARLES J. RUSSO, THE YEARBOOK OF EDUCATION LAW 2002 42 (Charles J. Russo ed., Education Law 
Association 2002) (“[C]ourts continue to define the increasingly complex and often controversial matters 
surrounding attempts to ensure an equitable balance between the rights of students and the duty of school officials to 
provide a safe learning environment.”). 
108H.C. HUDGINS, JR. & RICHARD S. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT 
DECISIONS 344 (5th ed. 1999).  
109 Hudgins & Vacca, supra note 108, at 344. 
110 See E. EDMUND REUTTER, JR., THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 763 (4th ed. 1994). 
111 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (Students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights…at the school house gate.”). 
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overview of students’ rights is necessary.  In examining these general principles it should 
become evident that students are not adequately protected under the law.  It should also be kept 
in mind that courts are highly deferential to the disciplinary decisions of school officials.112  
The United States Supreme Court has held that public education is a property interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.113  In San Antonio v. Rodriguez,114 the Court found that 
public education is not an explicitly guaranteed Constitutional right.115  Two years later in Goss 
v. Lopez,116 the Court eventually found that public education is merely a property interest or 
entitlement rather than a right or privilege.117  Thus, the Court has not fully accepted the idea that 
public education should be considered a “right.”118  The determination of whether education is 
deemed a “fundamental right” is crucial for a due process challenge.119 
Substantive due process refers to the power the government to enact laws affecting or 
regulating certain activities.  Where a fundamental right is being impaired by a particular statute 
or regulation, a reviewing court will employ a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the 
government may legislate the activity in question.120  This standard of review presents a 
formidable obstacle for the government to overcome.  If the reviewing court determines that the 
                                                 
112 See e.g., Woodland v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (While students “do have substantive and procedural 
rights while at school,” “it is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which 
the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); 
Colvin v. Lowndes Cty. Sch. Dist., 114 F.Supp2d 504 (N.D. Miss. 1999). 
113 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
114 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
115 See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  Rodriguez was an Equal Protection case dealing with public 
school finance.  Thus, the Court declined to “determine whether [public education] must be regarded as [a] 
fundamental [right] for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”   Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25.  
The Court did state that public education “is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”  Id. at 42.   
116 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
117 Some states, however, have determined that public education is akin to a fundamental right under state law.  See 
e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584 (1971). 
118 See Hudgins & Vacca, supra note 108, at 354. 
119 See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000). 
120 See Seal, 229 F.3d at 574 (the policy will be “upheld only where they are narrowly tailored to a compelling 
government interest.”). 
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interest involved does not rise to the level of a fundamental right, then a lower standard of 
review, known as rational basis, is employed.121  Because this is the framework in which courts 
work to assess the validity of a substantive due process challenge, the Court’s ruling in Goss, that 
public education is not a fundamental right, means that virtually all education regulations will be 
upheld on substantive due process grounds.  In this regard, Courts have recognized that 
education laws are necessary, and have further acknowledged that the suspension or expulsion of 
students is required under certain circumstances.122 Therefore, suspensions and expulsions are 
better addressed under procedural due process in most circumstances.123 
The Due Process Clause requires the state to ensure that procedural safeguards are 
satisfied whenever it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.124  A court must first 
determine whether a “life,” “liberty,” or “property” interest is involved.  If so, the court must 
then decide how much “process” is warranted under the circumstances – i.e., how much notice is 
required?  Is there a need for some type of hearing?  Is there a right to counsel?  “Although some 
states have had statutes on their books for many years that guaranteed to students certain 
elements of procedural due process, the matter was not seriously challenged until the 1960s.”125 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided In re Gault,126 which established the 
right of minors to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment prior to being institutionalized 
in a juvenile center.127  Although Gault did not specifically apply to school suspensions or 
                                                 
121 See id. at 575 (“rationally related to a legitimate state interest”). 
122 See Hudgins & Vacca, supra note 108, at 355. 
123 “Courts have been more active with respect to the procedural rights of students who are to be excluded from 
school rather than with the authority of the school to exclude.”  Id. at 356. 
124 U.S. Const., amend. XIV. 
125 Hudgins & Vacca, supra note 108, at  356. 
126 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
127 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  (The Court held that minors in juvenile cases were entitled to: 1) specific 
notice of the charges against them within a sufficient time to prepare for a hearing; 2) notification of the right to 
counsel; 3) privilege against self-incrimination, and 4) the right to confrontation and cross-examination of 
witnesses); see also Hudgins & Vacca, supra note 108, at 356. 
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expulsions, savvy litigants and lower courts attempted to extend its holding into educational 
law.128  The Court’s decision in Goss settled this point of law to some degree. 
The Goss Court held that in situations where the student is to be suspended less than ten 
days, the student must be given, at a minimum, informal notice of the charges against them and 
an opportunity of some sort of hearing.129  Because the Court found that public education is 
merely a property interest, only minimum due process is required for suspensions shorter than 
ten days. The Court, however, indicated that the due process analysis was flexible in this regard 
and the amount of due process afforded to the student depends on the nature of the misconduct 
and the severity of the punishment.130  Goss did not decide what amount of due process is 
required for suspensions longer than ten days.131  As will be discussed below, many zero 
tolerance policies have been challenged on procedural due process grounds. 
In addition to due process grounds, many suspensions or expulsions have been attacked 
on Equal Protection grounds predicated upon racial discrimination.  As mentioned above, 
research has revealed disparities in the suspension and expulsion rates for students of color.132  
Students, like all citizens, are protected from discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”133  At its most basic level, the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits states, including public schools, from discriminating on the 
                                                 
128 See Hudgins & Vacca, supra note 108, at 358. 
129 See id.    
130 See id. (Also, “[t]he Court held that school officials may remove a student from school prior to a suspension if his 
presence is a danger to persons or property or is disruptive to teaching and learning.”). 
131 Thus, the Court did not fully extend the protections provided under Gault to public school suspensions and 
expulsions.  See id. (“It held that a school does not have to allow a student to be represented by counsel, to have 
witnesses, or to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.”).  The Court reaffirmed this point in Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  Fraser involved a two-day suspension, and the Court noted that this 
suspension “does not rise to the level of a penal sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process 
protections applicable to a criminal prosecution.”   Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686.    
132 See Zweifler & De Beers, supra note 57, at 204. 
133 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.   
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basis of race, color, or national origin.134  In determining whether a statute or school policy is 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of race or national origin, courts will 
examine the statute or policy under a strict scrutiny analysis – i.e., the statute or policy in 
question must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.135  But the 
United States Supreme Court also requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the government, or 
school board, intended to discriminate in enacting or applying the regulation.136  Thus, a showing 
that a particular class of persons was disparately affected without more will not make out a claim 
for an Equal Protection violation.137   
Students are additionally protected from discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.138  Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by 
agencies that receive federal funding – i.e., public schools.139  There are two different types of 
Title VI claims: one that mirrors an Equal Protection claim, in that a plaintiff must show 
disparate treatment and a discriminatory motive, and the other claim permits a cause of action in 
which a racially neutral law merely has an adverse impact.140  Title VI claims are an 
underutilized tool for students who have been discriminated against by their respective school 
systems.141 
Any discussion of student rights with respect to exclusions from school must necessarily 
include a discussion on the implications such exclusions may have on special education students.  
                                                 
134 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“The Fourteenth Amendment, as 
now applied to the states, protects the citizens against the state itself and all of its creatures – boards of education not 
excepted.”). 
135 See Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 F.Supp.2d 812, 825 (C.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 251 F.3d 662 (7th 
Cir. May 24, 2001).  
136 See Washington. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
137 See Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 F.Supp.2d 812, 824-26 (C.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 251 F.3d 662 (7th 
Cir. May 24, 2001). 
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
140 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.5-7. 
141 See id. at 5. 
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Students with disabilities are protected under federal law to ensure that their school or society 
does not cast such students aside.  Of key importance to our discussion on zero tolerance 
disciplinary policies is the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”).142  IDEA 
mandates that certain procedural safeguards be followed when excluding a special education 
student from school.143  Furthermore, IDEA prohibits excluding special education students from 
school for conduct that is a manifestation, or direct result, of their disability.144  Because IDEA 
affords added protections to students with disabilities and many zero tolerance policies have the 
potential to circumvent these procedures, IDEA needs to be considered when evaluating any zero 
tolerance policy. 
There are many more protections afforded to students, but these are the main causes of 
actions with regards to the devastating effects of zero tolerance policies.  Below is a brief sample 
of some cases that have challenged zero tolerance policies. 
1. Seal v. Morgan145 
In 1996, Seal, a high school junior from Knox County, Tennessee, was suspended for 
possession of a knife while on school property in violation of the school’s zero tolerance 
policy.146  Seal’s classmate and friend, Pritchert, was involved in a dispute with a third male 
student over a girl.147  Out of fear, Pritchert began carrying a hunting knife in order to protect 
                                                 
142 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 
143 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(c).  See also Honing v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).  In Honing, two students with 
emotional disabilities were suspended indefinitely following misconduct that was related to their disabilities.  See 
Honing v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1988).  The United States Supreme Court held that a ten-day suspension of a 
student with a disability does not constitute a “change in educational placement.”  The Court, however, found that a 
school may not automatically expel or indefinitely suspend a student with a disability without adhering to the 
mandates of IDEA. 
144 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(c); see also Marilyn A. Mahusky, et al., Discipline for Students with Disabilities: 
Ensuring Both School Safety and Access to Education, 28-JUN VT. B.J. 44 (2002). 
145 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000). 
146 See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 2000). 
147 See Seal, 229 F.3d at 570-71. 
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himself.148  Pritchert had shown the knife to Seal and another friend, Richardson.149  
Unbeknownst to Seal, Richardson took the knife from Pritchert and placed it in the glove 
compartment of Seal’s car.150  The next evening, Seal, Pritchert, and Seal’s girlfriend drove the 
car to the high school’s football game to perform in the band.151  Four other students informed 
school officials that saw Seal, Pritchert, and Seal’s girlfriend drinking alcohol in the car prior to 
entering the game.152  The assistant principal searched their coats and instrument cases, finding 
no evidence of alcohol.153  The assistant principal then asked Seal if he could search his car, Seal 
consented, and the assistant principal found the knife in the glove compartment.154 
Seal was suspended, pending an expulsion determination for the possession of the 
knife.155  Seal, accompanied by his parents, attended a disciplinary hearing where Seal stated that 
while he knew that Pritchert was carrying a knife, he did not know that Richardson had placed 
the knife in his car.156  The hearing officer upheld the school’s decision to suspend Seal pending 
a expulsion hearing conducted by the school board.  At the expulsion hearing, Seal, who was 
represented by counsel, again argued that he had no knowledge that the knife was in his car.  The 
school board unanimously approved Seal’s expulsion from school under its zero tolerance 
policy.157 
                                                 
148 See id. at 571. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See Seal, 229 F.3d at 571. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. at 572.  
156 See id. at 572-73.  Both Richardson and Seal’s girlfriend confirmed Seal’s description of the events and further 
stated that Seal had no knowledge of the knife in the car.  See id. at 572. 
157 See id. at 572-73.  The school district’s policy stated that students that were found in possession of a firearm 
would be suspended or expelled “not less than one year.”  Seal, 229 F.3d at 573. 
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  Seal brought suit and argued, inter alia, that the board violated his rights under the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.158  The Sixth Circuit 
found, using rational review, that a suspension or expulsion for weapon possession under a zero 
tolerance policy was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest when the student did not 
knowingly possess the weapon.159  The court stated that:  
No student can use a weapon to injure another person, to disrupt school 
operations, or, for that matter, any other purpose if the student is totally unaware 
of its presence.  Indeed, the entire concept of possession – in the sense of 
possession for which the state can legitimately prescribe and mete out punishment 
– ordinarily implies knowing or conscious possession…We would have thought 
this principle so obvious that it would go without saying.160 
 
The court remanded the case for a determination as to whether Seal had actually known of the 
knife.161 
 The Sixth Circuit ended its opinion with some powerful language concerning the need for 
school safety and students’ rights. 
We understand full well that the decision not to expel a potentially dangerous 
student also carries very serious potential consequences for other students and 
teachers.  Nevertheless, the Board may not absolve itself of its obligation, legal 
and moral, to determine whether students intentionally committed the acts for 
which their expulsions are sought by hiding behind a Zero Tolerance Policy that 
purports to make students’ knowledge a non-issue.  We are also not impressed by 
the Board’s argument that if it did not apply its Zero Tolerance Policy 
ruthlessly…this would send an inconsistent message to its students.  Consistency 
is not a substitute for rationality.162 
 
2. Ratner v. Louden Cty. Pub. Sch.163 
Ratner, a thirteen-year old, had taken a knife from a friend after she informed Ratner that 
she was going to use the knife to commit suicide.164  Ratner convinced his friend to turn over the 
                                                 
158 See id. at 573. 
159 See id. at 574-76. 
160 Id. at 575-76.   
161 See id. at 580. 
162 Id. at 581. 
163 16 Fed.Appx. 140 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1114 (Jan. 22, 2002). 
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knife, took possession of a binder which contained the knife, and placed it in his locker for 
safekeeping.165  Eventually, the school found out about the knife and called Ratner to the 
principal’s office.  After Ratner was questioned, he admitted to possessing the knife and 
retrieved it from his locker.  The principal “acknowledged that she believed Ratner acted in what 
he saw as the [friend’s] best interest and that at no time did Ratner pose a threat to harm anyone 
with the knife.”166  Nevertheless, Ratner was suspended for four months for possessing a weapon 
in violation of the school’s zero tolerance policy. 
Ratner brought suit, alleging the school violated his due process and equal protection 
rights.167  The district court found for the school and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.168  The Fourth 
Circuit stated that “[t]he district court…concluded, correctly, that the school officials gave 
Ratner constitutionally sufficient, if imperfect, process in the various notices and hearings it 
accorded him.”169  The court further stated that “the federal courts are not properly called upon to 
judge the wisdom of a zero tolerance policy of the sort alleged to be in place [here] or of its 
application to Ratner.”170 
                                                                                                                                                             
164 See Ratner v. Louden Cty. Pub. Sch., 16 Fed.Appx. 140, 141 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1114 (Jan. 
22, 2002). 
165 See Ratner, 16 Fed.Appx.  at 141.  Ratner claimed that he intended to inform both his parents and his friend’s 
parents of the incident after school that day.  See id. 
166 Id. at 141. 
167 See id  at 142.  Ratner also argued that his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment had been violated.  See id at 142. 
168 See id  at 142. 
169 Id. at 142 
170 Ratner, 16 Fed.Appx. at 142.  Although agreeing in the outcome, Judge Hamilton felt compelled to write 
separately. 
I write separately to express my compassion for Ratner, his family, and common sense.  Each is 
the victim of good intentions run amuck…The panic over school violence and the intent to stop it 
has caused school officials to jettison the common sense idea that a person’s punishment should fit 
his crime in favor of a single harsh punishment, namely, mandatory school suspension.  Such a 
policy has stripped away judgment and discretion on the part of those administering it; refuting the 
well established precept that judgment is the better part of wisdom…Suffice it to say that the 
degree of Ratner’s violation of school policy does not correlate with the degree of punishment. 
Id. at 143. 
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3. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ.171 
Two students were suspended for “undisciplined, defiant, and abusive” behavior.172  The 
behavior in question included fighting, directing abusive language at school officials, truancy, 
disobeying their classroom teacher’s instructions, and resisting corporal punishment.  The Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the automatic suspensions were unlawful because the school board may 
not simply confirm the principal’s recommendation to exclude the students.173 
Because of the severe punishment the court found that the board must make its own 
independent determination of the appropriateness of the punishment.174  The Fifth Circuit stated: 
Formalistic acceptance or ratification of the principal’s request or 
recommendation as to the scope of punishment, without independent Board 
consideration of what, under all the circumstances, the penalty should be, is less 
than full due process.175 
 
4. Colvin v. Lowndes Cty. Sch. Dist.176 
In Colvin, a sixth grade student was expelled for bringing a Swiss Army key chain to 
school.177  The key chain was given to the student by his mother.178  The key chain fell out of the 
student’s backpack, the student was questioned by his teacher, admitted to owning the key chain, 
and gave it to the teacher without incident.  The student was expelled for one calendar year.179 
                                                 
171 490 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974). 
172 Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974). 
173 See Lee, 490 F.2d at 460. 
174 See id. 
175 Id. 
176 114 F.Supp.2d 504 (N.D. Miss. 1999). 
177 See Colvin v. Lowndes Cty. Sch. Dist., 114 F.Supp.2d 504, 507 (N.D. Miss. 1999).  The key chain contained a 
knife, as well as a nail file and scissors.  See Colvin, 114 F.Supp.2d at 507 n.3. 
178 See id. at 507 n.3.The mother worked as a nurse and received the key chain from a pharmaceutical sales 
representative.  See id. 
179 See id. at 507-08. 
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The school board asserted that its zero tolerance policy for weapon possession required it 
to expel a student for one year regardless of the surrounding circumstances.180  The Northern 
District of Mississippi reversed the expulsion and ordered reinstatement.181  The court found that 
Employing a blanket policy of expulsion, clearly a serious penalty precludes the 
use of independent consideration of relevant facts and circumstances.  Certainly, 
an offense may warrant expulsion, but such punishment should only be handed 
down upon the Board’s independent determination that the facts and 
circumstances meet the requirements for instituting such judgment.  By casting 
too wide a net, school boards will effectively snare the unwary student.  “The 
school board may choose not to exercise its power of leniency.  In doing so, 
however, it may not hide behind the notion that the law prohibits leniency for 
there is no such law.  Individualized punishment by reference to all relevant facts 
and circumstances regarding the offense and the offender is a hallmark of our 
criminal justice system.”182   
  
The court extended the holding of Lee to find that a school board may not simply defer to a zero 
tolerance policy.183  The district did not take anything into consideration but the “unwritten 
blanket policy of expulsion” and, therefore, violated the student’s rights.184 
5. Bd. of Sch. Trustees v. Barnell185 
  This case, similar to the facts in Colvin, reached an opposite result.  A student was 
expelled for bringing a Swiss Army knife to school.186  The district’s student-conduct policies 
required a mandatory expulsion for any student that possesses a knife while at school.  The 
student argued that his suspension was arbitrary and the punishment too severe under the 
circumstances because he did not intend to use the knife in any violent fashion.  The student 
                                                 
180 See id. at 510-11. 
181 See id. at 512-13. 
182 Colvin, 114 F.Supp.2d at 512 (quoting Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237, 241 (Miss. 
1985). 
183 See id. at 512. 
184 Id. at 512-13. 
185 678 N.E.2d 799 (Ind. App. 1997). 
186 See Bd. of Sch. Trustees v. Barnell, 678 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. App. 1997).   
 29 
further argued that he did not have notice of the student policy and, in any event, his expulsion 
was in no way related to ensuring general school safety.187 
 The Indiana Appellate Court upheld the expulsion.  Although the student asserted that he 
did not receive notice that he could be expelled for a seemingly harmless first offense, the court 
found that the district’s zero tolerance policy was clearly spelled out and the repercussions of 
violating that policy were also well detailed.188  Thus, the court ruled that the expulsion under the 
zero tolerance policy was lawful and not arbitrary.189 
6. Lyons v. Penn. Hills School District190  
Lyons, a seventh-grader, found a Swiss Army knife lying in the hallway while at 
school.191  Later that day, Lyons was observed by a teacher filing his nails with a file contained 
within the knife.  The teacher requested the knife, Lyons turned it over without incident, and 
Lyons was charged with possession of a weapon at school and was suspended indefinitely 
pending an expulsion hearing.  At the hearing, a school official stated that “the knife in question 
constitutes a weapon under the district’s ‘zero tolerance policy,’ and thus, a one-year suspension 
was warranted.”192  The school official further stated that the district in making their 
determination never considered the student’s record.193  The student brought suit, alleging 
violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights.194  
The court found that the district exceeded its authority in implementing such a rigid zero 
tolerance policy for weapons without including a provision for discretionary review.195  Because 
                                                 
187 See Barnell, 678 N.E.2d at 801-02, 805. 
188 See id. at 805-06. 
189 See id. at 806. 
190 723 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). 
191 See Lyons v. Penn. Hills Sch. Dist., 723 A.2d 1073, 1074 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). 
192 Lyons, 723 A.2d at 1074. 
193 See id. at 1074. 
194 See id. at 1074-75. 
195 See id. at 1075-76. 
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a Pennsylvania statute required the superintendent to exercise discretion and modify disciplinary 
actions on a case-by-case basis, the court determined that the policy was unlawful.196 
7. Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd197 
In Byrd, two high school students were expelled from school for one semester for 
defacing school property in violation of the school board’s zero tolerance policy.198  The policy 
mandated automatic suspension or expulsion for any student that defaced school property.  The 
Mississippi Supreme Court was highly deferential to the school’s decision and upheld the 
expulsion.199 
The court found that simply because a school policy contains “mandatory” language does 
not necessarily mean that the school board cannot exercise some degree of discretion.200  The 
court stated  
That a school rule may be worded in mandatory language does not deprive school 
boards and their subordinates of the authority to administer the rule with 
flexibility and leniency.  The school board may choose not to exercise its power 
of leniency.  In doing so, however, it may not hide behind the notion that the law 
prohibits leniency for there is no such law.201 
 
As such, the court concluded that a mandatory zero tolerance policy is not per se unlawful 
merely because it is mandatory.  The court did recommend, however, that the punishment should 
be lessened under these circumstances.202  The court suggested that the board could instead 
require the students to clean the defaced property, or increase their coursework, or take away the 
students’ extracurricular activities.203  Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme Court suggested 
that the students memorize an excerpt from The Merchant of Venice so that the students “could 
                                                 
196 See id. 
197 477 So.2d 237 (Miss. 1985). 
198 See Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1985). 
199 See Byrd, 477 So.2d at 240-42. 
200 See id. at 240-41. 
201 Id. at 241. 
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learn from Portia that ‘the quality of mercy is not strain’d’ and that the ‘earthly power 
doth…show likest God’s when mercy seasons justice’ – and teach this to their principal, their 
superintendent, their school board, and their community.”204 
8. Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ.205 
In Fuller, several African American students were expelled for their participation in a 
fight that occurred during a high school football game.206  The students brought suit and argued 
that the Board’s decision to expel under the district’s zero tolerance policy was unconstitutional.  
The students asserted that by punishing them as a group the Board violated their individual due 
process rights were violated.  The expelled students further argued that the Board’s decision was 
based upon race rather than the misconduct itself.207  
The Central District of Illinois disagreed.  In fact, the court found that the students failed 
to demonstrate that the Board enacted or implemented any sort of formal zero tolerance 
policy.208  While the students pointed to a Board resolution setting forth a “no-tolerance position 
on school violence,”209 the court remained unpersuaded.210  Instead, the court found that the 
resolution played no role in the Board’s decision to expel; rather the students were lawfully 
expelled based upon sufficient evidence of gross misconduct.211 
                                                 
204 Id. at 242. 
205 78 F.Supp.2d 812 (C.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 251 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. May 24, 2001). 
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The Fuller court found that the Board’s disciplinary decision was entitled to deference.212  
With respect to the resolution, the court found it nothing more than a political statement 
condemning school violence in general.213 
II.  Analysis 
A. Legal Challenges to Zero Tolerance Disciplinary Policies 
While there are numerous legal theories that could be advanced to challenge zero 
tolerance disciplinary policies, the three best avenues consist of due process, racial or national 
origin discrimination, and IDEA claims.  Each claim will depend on the facts of each case.  It 
should be noted that each type of claim is wrought with their own difficulties and that a student 
wishing to challenge a zero tolerance policy faces an uphill battle. 
1. Due process 
a. Substantive due process 
A substantive due process challenge deals with the school board’s power to adopt a zero 
tolerance policy.214  This does not go to the sufficiency of the procedures employed in meting out 
the suspension or expulsion.  Rather it is the school board’s method of affecting the students’ 
rights.  The policy being attacked will be a valid exercise of board authority if the policy is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.215  Thus, “review and revision of a school 
                                                 
212 See id. at 821. 
213 See Fuller, 78 F.Supp.2d at 826.  See also West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 260 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 
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214 See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000). 
215 See Seal, 229 F.3d at 575.  As we have seen, public education is not considered a fundamental interest that 
warrants strict scrutiny review.  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975). 
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suspension on substantive due process grounds would only be available in a rare case where 
there was no ‘rational relationship between the punishment and the offense.’”216 
The student must normally show that the suspension or expulsion was “arbitrary, 
capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere 
conducive to learning”217 in order to overcome rational review.218  This is an extremely difficult 
task given the deferential treatment courts give to school discipline decisions.219  Courts are 
usually unwilling to reverse a school’s disciplinary decision on substantive due process grounds 
even though the court views the punishment as harsh.220   
A substantive due process challenge is fact intensive and will necessarily depend on the 
circumstances of each case.  A possible method of invalidating a zero tolerance policy on 
substantive due process grounds is demonstrating to the court that the decision to exclude is 
wholly unreasonable because the student lacked the intent to commit the act in question.221  If the 
student did not knowingly and intentionally break the rule, than the punishment may not be 
rationally related to the school’s need to preserve safety. 
b. Procedural due process 
Procedural due process claims represent, arguably, the most valuable weapon an advocate 
has in their arsenal to mount a zero tolerance policy attack.222  In order to maintain a procedural 
due process claim, a plaintiff must “(1) identify a protected property or liberty interest; (2) 
demonstrate that they were deprived of that interest by state action; and (3) establish that the 
                                                 
216 Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Mitchell v. Bd. of Trustees, 625 
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219 See Woodland v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975).  
220 See e.g., Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1985). 
221 See Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2000). 
222 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.21. 
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deprivation occurred without due process.”223  A student suspended under a zero tolerance policy 
can easily satisfy the first two steps of this analysis.  As mentioned above, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that public education is classified as a property interest.224  Secondly, 
the Court has further held that exclusion from school “for more than a trivial period” equates to a 
sufficient deprivation of a property interest to implicate the Due Process Clause.225   
The third step, determining how much process is due to the student, is the most 
problematic for both litigants and courts alike.  At its core, procedural due process requires the 
person be given notice that they are to be deprived of their protected interest, an opportunity to 
be heard, and that such hearing be conducted in a fair manner.226  In school discipline cases, the 
amount of process due to a particular student depends on whether the exclusion is a short-term 
suspension or a long-term suspension or expulsion.227  The student’s claim, therefore, depends on 
whether the exclusion from school was shot or long-term. 
For short-term suspensions of less than ten days, the subject of Goss, the Court has held 
that the student must receive “oral or written notice of the charges against him and if he denies 
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side 
of the story.”228  The hearing, where the student gets an opportunity to recount their version of 
the events, does not need to be a formal adversarial hearing.229  All that is required under the Due 
                                                 
223 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.22 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 
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Process Clause is an “informal give-and-take between the student and the disciplinarian.”230  
Students and advocates should be aware of informality in which these hearings are conducted 
and should further realize that these hearings are held to be a sufficient method of protecting the 
student’s due process rights.  Thus, for suspensions of ten days or less, the student is not entitled 
to counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them, or to put on witnesses in 
their own defense.231  Short-term suspensions are difficult to challenge based upon perceived 
procedural irregularities. 
It is unlikely, however, that a student will be suspended from school for a period of less 
than ten days under a zero tolerance disciplinary policy.  The vast majority of these policies 
require long-term suspensions or expulsions for targeted misconduct.  As such, an advocate 
should be aware of the due process requirements for short-term suspensions, but should instead 
familiarize themselves with the due process requirements for long-term suspensions. 
The Supreme Court has been silent and lower courts are split over the due process 
requirements for long-term suspensions and expulsions.232  In the meantime, two cases, 
Matthews v. Eldridge233 and Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ.,234 have filled the gap in the 
absence of direct Supreme Court precedent.235 Matthews, while not a school discipline case, is 
illustrative on how a reviewing court will conduct a balancing test to determine the amount of 
due process necessary for a long-term school suspension.236  The Matthews Court set forth the 
following factors to be considered in determining the procedural due process necessary in any 
given situation: 
                                                 
230 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
231 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.23. 
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.237 
 
While Matthews does not set forth any bright line rule, the decision should be a guidepost when 
arguing that procedural due process was not adhered to under a zero tolerance policy.   
 For example, an advocate, while conceding that the school has an interest in maintaining 
discipline and ensuring educational harmony, should be able to demonstrate that the student’s 
interest in their education is extremely important.  Furthermore, if a long-term suspension or 
expulsion could result, then the advocate should detail the negative consequences that may arise 
from any significant deprivation – e.g., falling behind in class work, higher dropout rates for 
students that are expelled, alienation from prominent authority figures, etc.238  Finally, it should 
be argued that the additional financial and administrative burdens placed upon the school are 
minimal and, in any event, are outweighed by the interest of the student in continuing their 
education. 
The other highly cited case in long-term suspension cases is Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of 
Educ.  Dixon, which dealt with the expulsion of college student, noted that 
[T]he rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without 
encroaching upon the interests of [the school].  In the instant case, the students 
should be given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written 
report on the acts to which each witness testifies.  He should also be given the 
opportunity to present…his own defense against the charges and to produce either 
oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf.239 
 
Thus, courts following the Fifth Circuit approach generally believe that the student is entitled to 
a hearing before the district board of education; with the opportunity to cross examine the 
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district’s witnesses and put on their own witnesses.240  Other courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, 
have held that a student facing long-term expulsions is not entitled to the names of witnesses and 
information such witnesses’ testimony.241   
 Although courts are split on the amount of procedural protections necessary for a long-
term suspension/expulsion, the following guidelines are generally accepted.  First, notice of 
charges is required.  It is well accepted that prior to suspending or expelling a student from 
school, the student must first be provided with notice of the charges against them.242  A student 
challenging a zero tolerance policy may be reinstated if they can prove that notice was never 
received. 
Second, the student has the right to some kind of hearing or opportunity to be heard.  The 
Supreme Court has found that a hearing entails the opportunity to be heard at a “meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.”243  As detailed above, an advocate should be aware of the holdings 
of both Lee and Colvin, whereby the school districts violated due process rights by merely rubber 
stamping a recommendation or policy without making an independent determination.244  If a zero 
tolerance policy dispenses with school officials’ power to modify punishments or eliminates any 
exercise of discretion in evaluating the circumstances surrounding the infraction, then a 
meaningful hearing may be absent.245  A hearing necessarily implies a fair hearing.246  The 
question to be asked is “[d]id the student have sufficient opportunity to respond to specific 
charges of misconduct and to have his side of the matter impartially considered before a decision 
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to punish…was made?”247  If the school failed to conduct a meaningful hearing, the student is 
entitled to reinstatement. 
Third, courts are split as to whether a student has a right to counsel when confronted with 
a long-term suspension or expulsion.248  “There is some legal weight that in an expulsion hearing 
in which the school board attorney plays a prominent role, a student should also be entitled to 
have an attorney represent him.”249 
Fourth, courts are unclear as to whether formal rules of evidence apply in long-term 
suspension or expulsion hearings.250  Additionally, courts are split as to whether students are 
entitled to confront, cross-examine, and compel witnesses to appear.251  Some courts have 
concluded that the right to confrontation and cross-examination is too fundamental to procedural 
due process so as to be cast aside, others have not.252  This is a “know your jurisdiction” type of 
argument. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that there are no bright line rules, the amount a process 
due depends on the severity of the punishment.253  The length of the exclusion, what misconduct 
triggered the zero tolerance policy, and what type of procedures were followed are case specific. 
If it is found that the school board failed to afford the student procedural due process the 
student is entitled to reinstatement.254  If the school board member or administrator knew, or 
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reasonably should have known, that the student was removed from the school without following 
the Constitutional safeguards, the school official may be held personally liable.255  In situations 
where school administrators have violated the constitutional rights of students, the Court has held 
that the student may bring an action for damages against the individual school board members.256  
Furthermore, where students have been suspended from school without procedural due process 
being adhered to, the student, if not injured, are entitled to recover only a nominal amount, which 
the Court has set at $1.00.257 
2. Equal protection based upon racial discrimination 
A potential argument to be advanced when attacking the application of a zero tolerance 
policy is that the school discriminated against the student on the basis of race or national origin.  
Statistics have shown that African-American and Hispanic students are more likely to be 
suspended or expelled under such policies.258  But maintaining a cause of action under the Equal 
Protection Clause against a school district is difficult even for the most experienced advocates. 
For an Equal Protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be shown that 
the school board or state had a discriminatory motive in implementing the zero tolerance policy 
or applying it to a particular student.259  Proving a discriminatory motive is difficult as a practical 
matter.  Even assuming arguendo that a particular school board harbors racial animus, the board 
is unlikely to publicly admit to it.260  Teachers, school officials, and legislators will generally not 
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openly comment that the purpose of a particular policy is to discriminate on the basis of race or 
national origin.261  Furthermore, because of the uniformity of most zero tolerance policies, racial 
animus is difficult to infer from the language of the policy in most instances.262  These policies 
tend to worded in generic terms and apply to all students with equal force.  Although proving 
discriminatory intent is difficult, it can be done. 
A person challenging a zero tolerance policy suspension or expulsion may be successful 
if they can show that the teacher or official that referred them for exclusion did so out of racial 
animus.263  As one scholar noted, the source of racial disportionality in suspension rates is a 
direct result of the number of office referrals made by classroom teachers.264 
Once the student is referred to the main office, there are no significant 
“differences between [W]hite and [B]lack students in the mean number of days 
per suspension…[but] African-American students [are] almost twice as likely to 
be referred to the office as [W]hite students.”265 
 
If a plaintiff can show that the teacher referred the student solely on the basis of race, then the 
necessary discriminatory motive may be satisfied.  
 A challenging student would need to gather particularized evidence that the teacher either 
harbors racial animus or demonstrate by statistical evidence that racial animus is the only logical 
inference.  Evidence that the teacher or official refers students of color more often than white 
students may be useful in this regard.  But this evidence is hard to come by. 
Because teachers and other school officials are the first to identify disciplinary 
infractions, if these officials are more prone to  report violations by students of 
color than by white students, there will be no record of white students’ 
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misconduct, thus making it very difficult to prove that similarly situated white 
students were not referred.266 
 
It becomes obvious that an Equal Protection claim based on race or national origin is difficult to 
prove due to the discriminatory intent requirement.  It may be true, as the research suggests, that 
students of color are disportionately affected under zero tolerance policies, but this alone is not 
enough to satisfy the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment.267  The appropriateness of an 
equal Protection claim will depend on the facts of each case. 
  3. Title VI claims based upon racial discrimination 
  Plaintiffs wishing to challenge zero tolerance policies based upon racial discrimination 
might fare better under a Title VI claim.  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any programs or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.268 
 
Title VI gives a person a private cause of action, permitting the claimant to file in either federal 
district court or with the appropriate government agency.269  Furthermore, some courts have 
recognized two different types of Title VI claims.270 
 The first type of claim is what is known as a “disparate treatment claim.”271  Disparate 
treatment claims closely mirror Equal Protection claims.  A claimant will need to show that the 
                                                 
266 Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.4.  But see Sherpell v. Humnoke Sch. Dist. No. 5, 619 
F.Supp. 670 (D.C. Ark. 1985).  In Sherpell, a court found that a school district’s disciplinary system was 
unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds.  The teachers at this particular school referred to African-American 
students as “niggers” and “coons.”  Additionally, a teacher testified about instances of corporal punishment 
administered to African-American students that were never received by white students in the district during her 
nine-year tenure in the school district. 
267 “[T]he law is clear that a claim of racial discrimination and violation of equal protection cannot be based upon 
mere statistics alone.”  Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 F.Supp.2d 812, 825 (C.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 251 
F.3d 662 (7th Cir. May 24, 2001). 
268 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
269 See Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). The main agency that enforces Title VI is the 
United States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”).  See Advancement Project, supra note 2, 
at Appendix II p.9.  
270 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p 6-9. 
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school’s policy has a disparate impact on students of color.272  If the challenging student can 
demonstrate a disparate impact, the school must then show that the policy and decision to 
exclude the student from school was based upon a non-discriminatory educational necessity.273  
The burden then shifts back to the student to demonstrate that less restrictive means were 
available to the school.274 
 Under disparate treatment claims, however, the student must also demonstrate a 
discriminatory motive.275  As such, the same difficulties inherent in maintaining an Equal 
Protection cause of action based upon racial discrimination are present under disparate treatment 
claims.276  The same type of evidence would need to be gathered as with an Equal Protection 
claim to demonstrate intent – i.e., a consistent pattern of racial discrimination in a school’s 
suspension or teacher’s referrals.277 
 The second type of Title VI claim is referred to as an “adverse impact claim.”278  Under 
this type of claim, direct proof of a discriminatory intent is dispensed with.279  
The essential difference is that an adverse impact claim challenges a seemingly 
neutral policy or practice and infers unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
disparate outcomes, while a disparate treatment claim looks closely at the actual 
practice to reveal specific instances of differential treatment and considers both 
direct and statistical evidence of racial bias.280 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
271 See id. at Appendix II p.5. 
272 See Pauken & Daniel, supra note 262. 
273 See id.   
274 See id.   
275 See id.; Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.6. 
276 “In fact, some courts have held that evidence of disparate impact, while a start, is not sufficient to state a claim 
for race or national origin discrimination in school discipline.”  See Pauken & Daniel, supra note 262, at 763. 
277 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.6.  “For example, in a 1995 complaint against the 
Benedictine Military School in Georgia, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights reviewed the 
school’s disciplinary records and found that white students who had committed offenses similar to those of blacks 
received substantially lighter sanctions…[the] OCR found the discipline policy to violate Title VI.”  Id. at 6-7. 
278 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.5. 
279 See id. 
280 Id. at 6 (citing In re Dillon Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 53 Educ. Rep. 1433 (1986)). 
 43 
The adverse impact test, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Guardian’s Assn. v. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n,281 prohibits federal funding “not only in programs that intentionally 
discriminate, but also in those endeavors that have a racially disproportionate impact on racial 
minorities.”282  The Court employs a three part test to determine whether a particular policy is 
violative of Title VI under an adverse impact theory.283  First, does the policy have a disparate 
impact based on race, color, or national origin?284  Second, is the policy a governmental 
necessity?285  Third, is there an alternative method available to reach the same result with less 
discriminatory impact?286  The three-part test is virtually identical to a disparate treatment claim 
minus the requirement of discriminatory motive.   
 Whether a student pursues a disparate treatment or adverse impact claim, the student 
must still prove a disparate affect on students of color.  Irrespective of whether a discriminatory 
motive needs to be shown, an advocate must still gather sufficient and compelling statistical 
evidence that a particular zero tolerance policy has a disparate impact.  The general data 
demonstrating that students of color are disproportionately excluded will not suffice.  The 
advocate needs to demonstrate that a particular school or district is adversely affecting students 
of color. 
3. Students with disabilities 
Students with disabilities are often those that are most adversely affected by zero 
tolerance disciplinary policies.287  However, regulations “that protect individuals with disabilities 
                                                 
281 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
282 See Guardian’s Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n , 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
283 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.7 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 421 
(1971)). 
284 See id.  
285 See id. 
286 See id.   
287 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.11 “Special education students are significantly 
overrepresented among the ranks of suspended students, in many districts representing one third or more of all 
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from discrimination and that guarantee an appropriate education for students with disabilities 
offer important safeguards for students who may be subjected to discipline under zero tolerance 
policies.”288  The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”) establishes rights and 
procedural safeguards for students with disabilities.289  IDEA requires school boards to ensure 
that students with disabilities receive a “free and appropriate education.”290  The Supreme Court 
settled the question early on as to whether schools could suspend special education students 
under the mandates of IDEA. 
In Honig v. Doe,291 an emotionally impaired student attending a general education 
program was expelled for misbehavior.292  At issue was the “stay put” provision of what is now 
IDEA.293  Under this provision, when the school and parents disagree over the student’s 
educational placement, the student remains in their current placement until the matter is 
resolved.294  The school in Honig, however, argued that because the student was a risk to himself 
and other students, it should have the right to exclude the student while placement discussions 
continued.295  The Court disagreed. 
The Court found that schools cannot unilaterally exclude special education students from 
school, but schools may temporarily suspend such students for up to ten days.296  If the school 
and parents cannot agree to the student’s placement during this ten-day period, the student is to 
be reinstated unless the school can prove that the student would be substantially likely to injure 
                                                                                                                                                             
suspensions.”  Id. (citing KIM BROOKS, ET AL., SCHOOL HOUSE HYPE: TWO YEARS LATER 19 (Justice Policy 
Institute/Children’s Law Center, Apr. 2000)). 
288 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.11. 
289 See id.   
290 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.  
291 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
292 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1988). 
293 See Honig, 484 U.S. at 310-12.   
294 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2000). 
295 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
296 See Honig, 484 U.S. at 322-23. 
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themselves or others.297  Much like procedural due process, ten days is the key time frame to 
keep in mind. 
Students with disabilities, therefore, may be suspended in the same manner as a general 
education student if the exclusion from school is less than ten consecutive school days.298  
Within this ten-day period, the school is not required to issue to the student their individualized 
education program (“IEP”).299  Generally, the same procedural due process requirements apply to 
short-term suspensions of special education students as would apply to general education 
students.300 
The ten-day rule becomes complicated, for example, when the student with a disability is 
suspended for a day or two throughout the school year. This point of law remains somewhat 
unclear.301  Regardless of how the particular jurisdiction construes this point, federal law makes 
it clear that if the student’s exclusions total more than ten days the school must at least consider 
whether such exclusions constitute a “change of placement.”302  The school and IEP team303 
should consider the following factors in determining whether a “change in placement” occurred: 
(1) the duration of each individual exclusion; (2) the aggregate duration of the exclusions; (3) the 
temporal proximity of the exclusions in relation to each other; and (4) the underlying reasons for 
                                                 
297 See id.  This is now known as a Honig injunction.  See Mahusky et al, supra note 144, at 45. 
298 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a)(1). 
299 See Mahusky et al, supra note 144, at 45.  All special education students have an IEP that describes the objectives 
the student is attempting to reach, as well as the services the school will provide to enable the student to reach those 
objectives.  See id.  
300 See id.  
301 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.13. 
302 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(b). 
303 Definition of IEP team. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.344. 
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the student’s exclusions from school.304  If the aggregate suspensions are deemed a change in 
placement, then the school must follow the procedures for a long-term suspension under IDEA. 
If a student with a disability is suspended for more than ten days (i.e.-a long-term 
suspension) or a change in placement is deemed to have occurred, IDEA mandates that certain 
procedures be followed.  The IEP team must convene no later than ten school days after the 
decision affecting the student’s placement is rendered.305  At this IEP meeting, the team must 
determine, based on all the available information, whether the student’s misconduct was a 
manifestation of the student’s disability.306  If the misconduct is a manifestation of the student’s 
disability, IDEA prohibits excluding the student for school.307 
There is a presumption that the student’s misconduct is a manifestation of the 
disability.308  In order to overcome this presumption and show that the misconduct was not a 
manifestation, the school must affirmatively demonstrate that (1) the services the school 
provided to the student were appropriate; (2) the student was properly placed and their IEP was 
appropriate; (3) the student’s disability did not impair their ability to appreciate the impact of 
their misconduct; and (4) the student’s disability did not impair the their ability to control the 
behavior in question.309  If the special education student behaves in a manner that is not a 
manifestation of their disability, the student may be disciplined in the same manner as general 
students.310  But unlike a general student, the school must continue to provide the special 
                                                 
304 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a)(1)(i).  Advocates should be aware that the longer the suspensions and the frequency 
of suspensions within a short period of time weigh heavily in favor of a change in placement.  See Mahusky et al, 
supra note 144, at 44-45. 
305 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(a)(2). 
306 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(c).  The IEP team reviews the student’s relevant information, parental observations, and 
expert evaluations procured by the student’s parents. See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.14. 
307 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(c). 
308 See id. 
309 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(c). 
310 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.15. 
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education student with educational services.311  The IEP team must meet to determine what 
services will be necessary to ensure that the student works towards their IEP goals and the school 
must continue to provide those services to the student.312 
If the student’s misconduct is deemed a manifestation of their disability, a school may not 
suspend or expel the student.313  The school must reevaluate the student’s IEP and reinstate the 
student in school.314  The school, however, may attempt to change the student’s IEP pursuant to 
IDEA provisions.315  But the school may not unilaterally change the student’s placement within 
the school, i.e. – the student “stays put.”.316 
In order to keep the student suffering from a disability in school, an advocate should 
demonstrate, where appropriate, that the conduct in question is a manifestation of the student’s 
disability.  Like most endeavors challenging a zero tolerance policy this will be fact intensive.  
The goals for special education students challenging  a zero tolerance policy is twofold: 
determine if an appropriate manifestation hearing was or will be conducted within ten days of the 
decision to exclude and demonstrate to the IEP team that the conduct in question was indeed a 
manifestation of the disability.317    
There are special rules, however, for a special education student that has been excluded 
from school under  zero tolerance policy for possession of a weapon on school property or who 
have knowingly possessed, used, sold, or solicited drugs.  In these circumstances, school officials 
                                                 
311 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a)(i)(ii). 
312 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.121(d)(2-3). 
313 See Advancement Project, supra note 2, at Appendix II p.15. 
314 See id. 
315 See id. at 14-15. 
316 See id. at 15.  This is what is known as the “stay put” provision of IDEA, whereby the student’s educational 
program is not disrupted and schools may not simply rid themselves of special education students via suspensions.   
317 In addition to the manifestation hearing, IDEA requires the IEP team to develop a functional behavior assessment 
plan and a behavior intervention plan in situations where a long-term suspension has issued See 34 C.F.R. §§ 
300.520(b)(1), 300.523(e).  A functional behavior assessment is designed to determine out why a student behaves as 
they do.  See Mahusky et al, supra note 144, at 46.  A behavior intervention plan seeks to encourage positive 
behaviors based upon the results of the functional behavior plan.  See id. at 46.  IDEA is flexible as to the both the 
timing and substance of these plans, but both plans are required.  See id.  
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may unilaterally exclude the student from general education and place them in an alternative 
education placement for up to forty-five days, assuming alternative education programs are 
available.318  But, the student has the right to keep up with their regular curriculum and IEP 
while in the alternative placement. If the school can demonstrate by “substantial evidence” that 
the student is substantially likely to injure themselves or others to an impartial officer, then the 
student will be kept in the alternative placement for an additional forty-five days.319 
CONCLUSION 
Zero tolerance disciplinary policies undermine essential societal values and traditional 
notions of fairness.  While politicians and some educators may believe that these policies are 
necessary to ensure school safety, strong research suggests that the costs outweigh the benefits.  
Far too often innocent students are swept up by these far-reaching rules.   
The problem with attacking zero tolerance policies is that school disciplinary regulations 
are well protected under the law.  Although not completely immune from challenge, zero 
tolerance policies are difficult to invalidate on due process and equal protection grounds.  As it 
stands, students are not adequately protected from the mindless application of such policies.  
Therefore, educators should exercise discretion when meting out any sort of exclusion from 
school rather than deferring to a senseless zero tolerance policy.  
                                                 
318 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a)(2). 
319 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.521. 
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